

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 077672  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:WNHOWELL:JFC  
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. ATHERTON  
NEA/ARN - MR. DRAPER  
INR - MR. SINDILAR  
S/S-O :SVALERGA  
IO - MR. HELMAN (SUBS)

-----127262 250257Z /61

O P 250202Z MAR 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 077672

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, UNSC, MOPS, LE, IS, PLO

SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON: BACKGROUND ON TYRE PROBLEM

1. CONSENSUS OF THINKING IN DEPARTMENT IS THAT TYRE

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IT HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED AND FULLY REFINED WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BECAUSE OF OUR DESIRE TO GET OUT SOMETHING QUICKLY. BEIRUT MAY WISH TO ADD COMMENTS.

2. WE CONSIDER IT LIKELY THAT UNIFIL WILL NOT BE ABLE, CERTAINLY FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, TO ENTER THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS AROUND TYRE AND SEIZE THE ARMS STORED THERE. FOR THE EARLY FUTURE, THE MOST OPTIMISTIC RESULT MIGHT BE FOR UNIFIL AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO RECOVER CONTROL OF MOST OF THE CITY OF TYRE AND THE PORT AREA, PERHAPS FREEING THE TOWN OF PALESTINIAN OFFICES AND A PALESTINIAN ARMED PRESENCE, WHILE THE CAMPS REMAIN INSULATED. WE DO NOT WANT ADDRESSEES IN ANY WAY TO ADVANCE SUCH INITIAL AND PRELIMINARY CONJECTURES; HOWEVER, ALL SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM IN DISCUSSIONS AND CONSUL GENERAL NEWLIN MIGHT WISH TO FIND AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO CONFIRM THAT GENERAL SILVASUO KNOWS WHAT KIND OF PROBLEM HE WILL BE FACING. AMB. LEONARD COULD DO THE SAME WITH URUQHART OR GUYER.

3. BEGIN BACKGROUND: OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS AND INCREASINGLY SINCE LATE 1976, THE AREA AROUND TYRE -- A TOWN OF SOME 35,000 INHABITANTS -- WAS TURNED INTO A MAJOR PALESTINIAN REDOUBT. EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE TOWN AND ITS PORT HAS BEEN IN FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE LEFTIST HANDS SINCE 1976 AND TYRE HAS SERVED AS THE PRIMARY PORT FOR SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO THE PALESTINIANS.

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ICAL IMPLICATIONS. VANCE

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP:JWTTWINAM

APPROVED BY: NEA:A. GLASPIE

NEA/ARN:MDRAPER (SUBS)

S/S-O:JETOBIN

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P 271859Z MAR 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0000

AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 077672

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 077672, SENT JERUSALEM TEL AVIV BEIRUT  
DAMASCUS USUN NEW YORK INFO AMMAN CAIRO JIDDA KUWAIT LONDON  
PARIS TEHRAN 25 MAR:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 077672

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ICAL IMPLICATIONS. VANCE UNQUOTE. VANCE

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## Message Attributes

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**Draft Date:** 25 mar 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
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**TAGS:** PEPR, MOPS, LE, IS, UNSC, PLO, UNIFIL  
**To:** JERUSALEM TEL AVIV MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/3aa6adbd-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
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